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INTRODUCTION
Two conceptions of the class action have long motivated debates
over its role in American civil litigation. Starting in the late 1960s,
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proponents of the then-fledgling device advocated a “regulatory”
understanding of its nature and purpose. As vehicles for law enforcement, they argued, class actions succeed when they prohibit or
deter widespread misconduct. Undue attention to the circumstances of individual class members and their claims interferes with
class-wide proceedings and serves little legitimate purpose. Class
action skeptics, by contrast, advanced a “conflict resolution”
conception.1 To them, the class action does little more than join individual claims for the purposes of adjudicative efficiency. Classwide litigation must respect preexisting features of these discrete
claims, even if attention to them precludes class certification or
otherwise creates considerable expense.
Combatants in fights over class action law and policy continue
to couch their arguments in regulatory and conflict resolution
terms. But these conceptions have earned their retirement, at least
as principled bases for doctrinal design. The claims that each
conception supports are fundamentally incommensurate.2 To those
convinced by the class action’s regulatory value, the fact that many
cases generate little recovery for individual class members matters
little. To those insistent that private litigation resolve genuine
conflicts, whatever regulatory effect litigation has cannot justify a
case that procures minimal relief for class members who barely
know that they are injured.
But the two conceptions have proven limited for a reason
beyond the inconclusive normative combat they have fueled.3 A

1. In prior work, one of us used the term “adjectival conception.” David Marcus, The
History of the Modern Class Action, Part II: Litigation and Legitimacy, 1981–1994, 86 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1785, 1809 (2018) [hereinafter Marcus, History Part II]. This term is less descriptive and
dissimilar from what scholars of the time used. We therefore use a new one here.
2. Robert Bone describes the landscape of debates over class action law and policy
by contrasting two competing “views” of the class action, but he uses different terms for
them and describes them with more theoretical nuance than what I provide here. Still, the
“internal” and “external” views, as he calls them, roughly correspond with the regulatory
and conflict resolution conceptions. Robert G. Bone, The Misguided Search for Class Unity, 82
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 651, 651–53 (2014). Prof. Bone likewise describes “the powerful influence
on the shape of modern class action law” that the “two views of the class” he describes have
had. Id. at 653. We agree with Professor Bone that “the two sides frequently talk past one
another.” Id. at 654.
3. Cf. David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang,
1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 609 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus, History Part I] (“Before
the 1960s ended, the now-hardened battle lines in the war over Rule 23 formed, with clashes
erupting over the same alleged legal and economic pathologies that fuel debates today.”).
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proponent of a powerful class action cannot maintain a principled
commitment to the regulatory conception and still argue consistently for doctrine that empowers the device. Likewise, a class action
skeptic cannot argue for the conflict resolution conception and
consistently advocate for restraint in procedural doctrine. If these
conceptions motivate doctrinal design, then either preference or
principle must be sacrificed.
We work through problems involving personal and subject
matter jurisdiction in class actions to illustrate this claim. These
problems warrant attention for two reasons. First, they remain
unanswered, and thus this symposium essay can contribute to their
resolution. The personal jurisdiction problem emerged abruptly in
summer 2017 after the U.S. Supreme Court rejected a specific strain
of personal jurisdiction doctrine for aggregate litigation in BristolMyers Squibb Co. v. California Superior Court, San Francisco County
(BMS).4 Defendants have seized on the decision to challenge a
decades’ old consensus that personal jurisdiction in class actions
depends on the relationship between the named plaintiff’s claim and
the defendant’s forum contacts. Arguing that each class member’s
claim must independently satisfy jurisdictional requirements,
defendants hope to narrow the plaintiff’s choice of forum in
multistate class actions considerably—an outcome that would have
significant ramifications for the enforcement of state law through
private litigation. The issue of BMS’s application in class actions
has “preoccupied” the federal courts, generating considerable
disagreement.5
The subject matter jurisdiction problem has to do with Article
III standing doctrine. Faced with inconclusive guidance from the
Supreme Court, the lower federal courts have long struggled to
fashion consensus answers to two related questions. Do differences
between the named plaintiff’s injury and those suffered by absent
class members deprive the former of standing to sue on the latter’s
behalf? If so, when do such differences create jurisdictional

4. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773,1777 (2017).
5. McCurley v. Royal Sea Cruises, Inc., 331 F.R.D. 142, 164 (S.D. Cal. 2019). As of the

time of writing, the Fifth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits are considering the issue but have not
yet issued decisions. D.C Circuit Wary of Putting Mass Tort Limit on Whole Foods Suit, LAW360
(Sept. 25, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1202715/dc-circ-wary-of-putting-masstort-limit-on-whole-foods-suit.
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problems? Some circuits insist that this “injury difference problem”
requires a test for named plaintiff standing. Others deny that such
differences require a standing analysis at all.6
Our second reason for focusing on the personal and subject
matter jurisdiction problems involves what we argue is the key to
each one’s resolution. Both hinge on a determination of whether
absent class members are juridically relevant, or whether absent class
members are parties or share party-like features. As a doctrinal
matter, this status changes depending on the procedural issue at
stake.7 But courts have long expressed the sentiment that, whatever
status an absent class member has for personal jurisdiction purposes,
principled doctrinal design requires that she have the same status
for subject matter jurisdiction purposes.8 After all, the doctrines
share a “key feature”: “[E]ach governs a court’s ability, constitutional or statutory, to adjudicate a particular person’s or entity’s
claim against a particular defendant.”9
The regulatory and conflict resolution conceptions seem
obviously germane to the question of absent class member juridical
relevance. Stressing the overall effect of litigation on the
defendant’s behavior, the regulatory conception deemphasizes
individual class member identity and thereby justifies a finding of
juridical irrelevance. Conversely, the conflict resolution conception
treats the class action as little more than a joinder device for discrete
claims that are independently litigable. It supports a determination
of absent class member juridical relevance.
Here is where principle and preference collide. A proponent of
a powerful class action can use the regulatory conception to justify
a class action exception to BMS. If absent class members are
juridically irrelevant, then only the named plaintiff’s claim remains
as the basis for the personal jurisdiction determination. But the
easiest answer to the injury difference problem requires that absent
class members be juridically relevant. If so, then standing in class
actions is no different than standing in other multiparty cases.
Differences between the named plaintiff’s claim and the class

6. See infra notes 138–146 and accompanying text.
7. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002).
8. See Al Haj v. Pfizer, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2018). For a pre-1966

case to this effect, see Calagaz v. Calhoon, 309 F.2d 248, 254 (5th Cir. 1962).
9. Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 820.
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members’ claims may impact class certification under Rule 23. But
these differences have no Article III implications. If, however, absent
class members are juridically irrelevant for standing purposes, then
the named plaintiff’s standing to represent others, however
different or similar their claims, becomes harder to justify. A class
action skeptic sits at the same crossroads. Juridical relevance raises
personal jurisdiction barriers to litigation, but it lowers subject
matter jurisdiction hurdles.
The best answers to the two jurisdictional problems indeed
align with preferences for liberality in class action doctrine. But a
principled justification for juridical irrelevance in one jurisdictional
context and juridical relevance in the other requires something other
than an argument couched in regulatory or conflict resolution
terms. A class action exception to BMS should exist, and the injury
difference problem should not trigger standing problems most of
the time. But these answers are right not because they best comport
with an abstract conception of litigation fixed a priori, or because
they posit a single juridical status for absent class members. Rather,
the answers best serve the basic policies and goals that animate
each line of jurisdictional doctrine.
Our Essay proceeds as follows. In Part I, we describe the
regulatory and conflict resolution conceptions, tracing their origins
to theorizing about the nature and purposes of litigation that
coincided with the class action’s emergence in the late 1960s. We
delve into personal jurisdiction in Part II. We argue that a class
action exception to BMS requires the juridical irrelevance of absent
class members, a status that the regulatory conception supports.
Part III turns to subject matter jurisdiction. We explain how the
juridical relevance of absent class members, a status that the conflict
resolution conception justifies, solves an Article III standing puzzle.
Their juridical irrelevance, by contrast, creates difficult jurisdictional problems. We conclude in Part IV. We argue against the
continued use of the regulatory and conflict resolution conceptions
as guides to doctrinal design, and we suggest a contextual,
pragmatic way to make a principled argument in favor of a class
action unencumbered by needless jurisdictional constraint.
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I. MODELS OF LITIGATION AND CONCEPTIONS OF THE
CLASS ACTION
The competing conceptions of the class action are more
particular versions of contrasting “models” of civil litigation that
first appeared in 1960s-era procedural commentary. During a
convulsive period for American civil justice that witnessed the
modern class action’s emergence, participants in debates over
litigation’s nature and purpose often cast their arguments in
regulatory or conflict resolution terms. These models and the
conceptions based on them continue to motivate arguments about
procedural law and policy.
As the landscape of American civil justice began to shift rapidly
in the 1960s, a number of prominent scholars crafted models that
tried to capture litigation’s essence.10 These models were similar to
each other, and they all came in pairs. A representative one, which
Kenneth Scott called the “conflict resolution” model,11 described
litigation as a process for resolving disputes between private
parties attempting to vindicate private rights.12 Its purpose, to
restore peace to an “essentially harmonious” system, 13 has several
implications for the process’s legitimate use. Cases must involve
“concrete disputes.”14 This requirement limits litigation to those
instances when social peace is genuinely threatened,15 incentivizes
parties to control the proceedings, and restricts participation to a
narrow set of individuals.16 To ensure that litigation restores and
does not transform a social, political, or economic status quo, a
lawsuit should be “bounded in effect[,]” and its impact should be
“limited to the (two) parties before the court.”17

10. William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 636 n.4 (1982) (commenting on these efforts and linking
them to changes to judicial practice).
11. Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937 (1975).
12. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1282 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Role of the Judge]; Meir Dan-Cohen, Bureaucratic Organizations
and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985); Paul Weiler, Two Models of Judicial
Decision-Making, 46 CAN. B. REV. 406, 410 (1968).
13. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18 (1979).
14. Weiler, supra note 12, at 414.
15. Scott, supra note 11, at 937–38.
16. Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 4–5 (1982) [hereinafter Chayes, Burger Court]; Weiler, supra note 12, at 414.
17. Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 5; see also Dan-Cohen, supra note 12, at 3.
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We call the second the “regulatory” model, although no scholar
at the time used precisely this term.18 This model attempted to
capture the various developments—the nascent class action,
legislated damages enhancements, fee-shifting provisions, the new
multidistrict litigation system, and so forth19—that were expanding
the footprint of American civil justice. Litigation does not merely
restore social peace pursuant to “established rules and principles”
of substantive law, as the conflict resolution model contemplated.20
Rather, litigation qua a regulatory process furthers the design and
administration of public policy.21 A lawsuit focuses not on
“particularized and discrete events” concerning a limited set of
private parties, but instead on a “social condition” that affects
groups.22 Discrete individual parties do not control the litigation or
serve as its exclusive subjects. Rather, “the party structure and the
matter in controversy are both amorphous.”23 A case seeks
prospectively-oriented remedies to vindicate the interests of
undifferentiated beneficiaries.24 Accordingly, litigation implicates
matters that extend well beyond “the effects of the decision on the
parties before the court.”25
Some scholars developed their versions of the paired models
simply as aids in understanding the shifting sands of American
civil justice.26 A normative tint colored others’ descriptive efforts.
Some championed the regulatory model’s emergence,27 and others
lamented it.28

18. Compare Chayes, Role of the Judge, supra note 12, at 1284 (“public law”), Dan-Cohen,
supra note 12, at 3 (“regulation”), Scott, supra note 11, at 938 (“behavior modification”), and
Weiler, supra note 12, at 407 (“policy-making”).
19. For histories of some of these developments, see generally SEAN FARHANG, THE
LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. (2010); Andrew
D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831
(2017); Marcus, History Part I, supra note 3.
20. Weiler, supra note 12; cf. Dan-Cohen, supra note 12, at 17 (noting that the arbitration
model assumes a “sharp distinction” between judging and legislating).
21. Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 5; Dan-Cohen, supra note 12, at 4; Fiss, supra
note 13, at 2; see Scott, supra note 11, at 938.
22. Fiss, supra note 13, at 18.
23. Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 5.
24. Id.; Fiss, supra note 13, at 19.
25. Dan-Cohen, supra note 12, at 3; accord Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 5.
26. See Scott, supra note 11, at 950; Weiler, supra note 12, at 471.
27. Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 7.
28. E.g., Simon H. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96, 101;
id. at 104.
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This fight over litigation’s legitimate uses and purposes found
concrete expression in disputes over the then-fledgling class
action.29 In prior work, one of us described two conceptions of the
class action, each connecting to one of the models, that crystallized
as debates over class action law and policy proceeded in the late
1960s and 1970s:
To proponents of the regulatory conception, a class was not an
assembly of discrete individuals, but a group of undifferentiated
regulatory beneficiaries on whose behalf litigation pursues
vindication of a substantive policy regime. The class action existed
to mobilize claims. The civil rights litigators, plaintiffs’ lawyers,
and progressive judges who advanced this view emphasized the
regulatory efficacy of the substantive law, not individualized
compensation for class members, as litigation’s goal. The
regulatory conception provided a normative justification for a
powerful class action device because it deemphasized differences
among individual class members’ claims and the particular relief
owed to them as subordinate to the regulatory imperative the
class action furthered.
Defense counsel, industry representatives, and others uncomfortable with powerful class action litigation argued for the [conflict
resolution] conception. They viewed Rule 23 as a mere joinder
device, no different in its essence than any of the other joinder
rules, and certainly not a device with a particular regulatory
mission. Rule 23 took the claims of otherwise disconnected
individuals and allowed their assembly in one case for the sake of
litigation efficiency. Individual relief remained the litigation’s
primary goal, and any other benefits the class action might create
were incidental.30

Participants in debates over class action law and policy
understood their preferences for an expansive or restrained device
in terms of the two conceptions.31 A good example comes from an

29. E.g., Editor’s Forword to Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 4 CLASS
ACTION REPORTS, Jan.–Feb. 1975 at 51 (“[A]cceptance of the validity of the Behavior
Modification Model is absolutely critical to the viability of the large class action lawsuit,
which is in turn a necessary prerequisite for the viability of that model.”).
30. Marcus, History Part II, supra note 1 (footnotes omitted); see also Marcus, History
Part I, supra note 3, at 593–94.
31. E.g., Chayes, Burger Court, supra note 16, at 28 (1982); Rifkind, supra note 28, at 102
& n.7 (citing to doctrines that facilitate class actions as examples of a mentality favoring the
use of courts as “problem-solvers”).
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internecine fight within the American Bar Association over a set of
proposed reforms to Rule 23 that gained considerable ground in the
1980s before ultimately failing.32 The ABA formed a “Special
Committee” to consider possibilities for class action reform. It
recommended changes that would have facilitated class litigation
by minimizing the relevance of class members’ individual
circumstances to the class certification decision and by weakening
participation rights for absent class members. “Central to the
Committee’s recommendations,” its final report noted, was the
conviction “that the class action is a valuable procedural tool
affording significant opportunities to implement important public
policies.”33
The ABA’s Antitrust Section dissented from the recommendations. Although the Section challenged various specifics, it also
faulted the Committee for taking sides in “a continuing and
sometimes bitter debate” over “diametrically opposed views as to
the fundamental purpose for which courts and private litigation
exist.” One side, the Section explained, “argues that the purpose of
private litigation should be to compensate injured parties”—a
traditional role fitting the conflict resolution model. The Antitrust
Section linked the Committee to the other side, or the view that
“private litigation should serve a higher purpose than the
compensation of victims, namely the deterrence of violations of
law.”34
As they did in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the conflict
resolution and regulatory models continue to motivate normative
claims about procedural design and litigation’s proper use.35 The
class action’s champions couch arguments in regulatory terms.
32. The ABA proposals went to the Federal Civil Rules Advisory Committee, which
used them as a basis for a set of proposed reforms that only ran aground in 1994. Marcus,
History Part II, supra note 1, at 1794–95.
33. Am. Bar Ass’n Section of Litig., Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee
on Class Action Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 198 (1986).
34. AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES
7–9 (1985) (on file with author).
35. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 153 (2005) (“[T]he classic and public law models represent
the dominant conceptions of adjudication . . . .”). For other important modeling exercises, see
Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law Dispute
Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 414–15 (1999); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges,
96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982); William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89
GEO. L.J. 371 (2001).
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Negative value cases win praise, for example, because they mobilize
claims that would lie dormant and thereby vindicate substantive
liability policy. They therefore incentivize better behavior through
cost internalization.36 Those who aim to limit the class action’s use,
on the other hand, argue for a conflict resolution conception.37
Negative value class actions get faulted because they yield little of
value to individual class members and arise from “faux” disputes
involving no real injuries.38
To the extent that each model or conception expresses a
normative vision of what roles litigation can legitimately assume,
they are incommensurate. Those committed to one of them are
likely to find arguments that smack of the other fundamentally
misguided or inapposite. Less appreciated are the limits to the
normative direction that either conception can offer to doctrinal
design. As a general matter, the regulatory conception correlates
with doctrine that empowers the class action and the conflict
resolution conception with doctrine that limits it. But this relationship is not necessarily so, as the rest of this essay shows by working
through the personal and subject matter jurisdiction problems.
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION, BRISTOL-MYERS,
AND THE CLASS ACTION EXCEPTION
Our argument for the two conceptions’ normative limits requires
some doctrinal spadework. This Part asks whether the claims of
absent class members matter to the determination of whether a
defendant comes within the court’s personal jurisdiction, a
question prompted by the 2017 BMS decision.39 A majority of lower

36. E.g., Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs
Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 104–05 (2006).
37. Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to Small-Claims
Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 319–22 (2010); Samuel Issacharoff, Class
Actions and State Authority, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 383–90 (2012); see Martin H. Redish et
al., Cy Pres Relief and the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical
Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV. 617, 622–23 (2010); cf. Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits:
Parsing the Debates Over Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 953–54 (2017)
(describing but not endorsing arguments couched in terms of the models).
38. Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection
of Private Litigation and Public Goals, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77–78 (2003).
39. Then-Professor Diane Wood addressed this issue in 1987. Diane P. Wood,
Adjudicatory Jurisdiction and Class Actions, 62 IND. L.J. 597, 616–17 (1987). We are unaware of
any serious engagement with it in the courts before BMS. See infra note 51.
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federal courts have refused to apply BMS in class actions, thereby
preserving the maximum jurisdictional reach for federal courts
supervising class actions. But their justifications for this class action
exception are thin. The regulatory conception can supply missing
normative heft by justifying a status of juridical irrelevance for
absent class members.
A. BMS
In BMS, several hundred plaintiffs, many of whom were
residents of states other than California, sued Bristol-Myers in a
California state court.40 They alleged injuries caused by their
ingestion of Plavix, a blood-thinning drug. The plaintiffs’ similar
cases, all filed by the same lawyers, got consolidated into a single
episode of litigation. Initially, the California Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court’s power to adjudicate the claims of other states’
residents based on a general jurisdiction theory.41 Bristol-Myers has
extensive contacts with California, including hundreds of millions
of dollars of Plavix sales and extensive research activities in the
state.42 After a U.S. Supreme Court decision narrowed general
jurisdiction’s boundaries, a California Court of Appeal revisited the
matter and determined that the state court had specific jurisdiction
over nonresidents’ claims.43 The California Supreme Court agreed.
Bristol-Myers’s extensive engagement in California, if insufficient
for general jurisdiction, warranted a looser connection between its
California contacts and nonresidents’ claims. The company had
targeted California as well as other states with a single, undifferentiated marketing and sales campaign. All of the plaintiffs’ claims
arose out of this conduct, even if some of them bought and used
Plavix in other states. The non-residents’ claims thus related
sufficiently to Bristol-Myers’s California contacts to meet the
specific jurisdiction threshold.44
The California Supreme Court abstracted away from the
specifics of each individual claim to assess personal jurisdiction.
This attempt to fashion a distinctive strain of jurisdictional doctrine
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1778 (2017).
Id. at 1778.
Id. at 1786 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1778 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1779.
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for aggregate litigation foundered in the Supreme Court. A state
infringes on another state’s sovereignty if it exercises its “coercive
power” through adjudication, the Court insisted, when the state
has “little legitimate interest in the claims in question.”45 The
legitimacy of this interest requires a claim-by-claim, not aggregate,
measure. Thus, the Court held, personal jurisdiction depends on
the connection between the defendant’s forum contacts and each
individual plaintiff’s “specific claims.” The defendant’s “forum
contacts that are unrelated to those claims,” no matter how
“extensive,” are irrelevant.46 None of Bristol-Myers’s California
contacts led directly to injuries in Kansas, Texas, or any of the
nonresident plaintiffs’ states. Accordingly, these contacts could not
require the company to litigate non-residents’ claims in California.47
BMS ensures that non-class aggregate litigation involving
plaintiffs from different states will proceed in one of only two sets
of fora.48 If the defendant has continuous and systematic contacts
with the forum state, the state has a legitimate interest in the litigation, regardless of where the plaintiffs’ claims arise. This general
jurisdiction exists in those states where the defendant is “at home,”
a category that for corporate defendants likely includes only the
state hosting its principal place of business and the state of its
incorporation.49 Otherwise, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation can consolidate multiple suits filed in different states and
transfer them to any federal court for pre-trial processing.50
B. The Class Action Exception
BMS involved the consolidation of hundreds of individuallyfiled claims into one proceeding. In a class action, of course, absent
class members do not individually file claims. The class certification
decision joins them. Before BMS, in no instance of which we are
aware did a class action fail because of an inadequate relationship

45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 1780.
Id. at 1781.
Id. at 1782.
Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: BristolMyers Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1252 (2018).
49. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (4th
ed. Apr. 2019 update).
50. Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1165, 1205, 1212–13 (2018).
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between the defendant’s forum contacts and absent class members’
claims.51
But many, beginning with Justice Sotomayor in her BMS
dissent, quickly appreciated the decision’s potential significance for
multistate class actions.52 Personal jurisdiction requires a close
nexus between the defendant’s forum contacts and each plaintiff’s
claim. If aggregation of any sort does not affect this standard
prerequisite, then BMS would seem to limit class counsel suing on
behalf of people from different states to one of two forum choices.
They could file a single multistate case in the court of a state that
has general jurisdiction.53 Otherwise, class counsel could file
several cases in several states, with each class defined to include
only those injured within each forum state. This strategy would
require class counsel to retain local counsel and litigate redundant
lawsuits unless they sought multidistrict litigation (MDL) transfer
51. See Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279-WHO, 2018 WL 6460451, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018) (“Prior to Bristol-Myers, there would have been no basis for [the
defendant] to mount a due process challenge against the nonresident absent class
members . . . .”); Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (describing the
defendant’s effort to apply Bristol-Myers to class actions as amounting to an “extraordinary
sea change in class action practice”); 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 6:26 (5th ed. Nov. 2018 update) (“Nationwide class actions filed against large national
corporations in states that are not their homes have not raised significant personal
jurisdiction challenges.”). Two of the country’s leading class action defense firms argued
after BMS that the decision amounted to a change in law for class actions. Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Support of Scotts’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for
Judgment on the Pleadings at 1, In re Morning Song Bird Food Litig., No. 3:12-cv-01592-JAHAGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44825 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2018) (No. 344-1) (Jones Day); Defendant
James Hagedorn’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s
September 29, 2016 Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Hagedorn’s
Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alternative, Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 1–2, In re
Morning Song Bird Food Litig., No. 3:12-cv-01592-JAH-AGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44825
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2018) (No. 345-1) (Kirkland and Ellis). For decisions describing the
doctrine pre-BMS, see, e.g., In re Western States Wholesale Natural Gas Antitrust Litig., No.
MDL 1566 2:03–CV–01431–PMP–PAL 2:07–CV–01019–PMP–PAL, 2009 WL 10692801, at *5
(D. Nev. Mar. 9, 2009) (“The named class representatives’ claims must satisfy the specific
jurisdiction test.”); Williams v. Firstplus Home Loan Trust 1996-2, 209 F.R.D. 404, 412 (W.D.
Tenn. 2002) (“[N]amed plaintiffs’ claims must satisfy the requirements for personal
jurisdiction . . . .”); Barry v. Mortgage Servicing Acquisition Corp., 909 F. Supp. 65, 73 (D.R.I.
1995) (“It is the named class representative . . . whose claims must satisfy [the specific
jurisdiction] test in order for the Court to have personal jurisdiction over [the
defendant] . . . .”).
52. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1789 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also
Bradt & Rave, supra note 48, at 1282, 1288.
53. Rafferty v. Denny’s, Inc., No. 5:18-cv-2409, 2019 WL 2924998, at *7 (N.D. Ohio July
8, 2019); 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 6:26 (5th ed. Nov. 2018
update).
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and consolidation. If class counsel did not pursue an MDL strategy,
the defendant would, unless litigating multiple smaller cases would
give the defendant a settlement advantage.54
Either way, BMS’s application would deprive class counsel of
control over forum choice. The party controlling the choice of forum
always has an advantage,55 but this advantage can be particularly
significant in class actions. The lower federal courts have splintered
on a number of important aspects of class action doctrine,
including, for instance, issue certification,56 administrative
feasibility,57 class member evidence-of-injury requirements,58 and,
as discussed below, class standing.59 Different approaches to the
choice-of-law problems created by multi-state class actions alleging
state law claims have particular significance for the sort of litigation
that BMS implicates.60
It perhaps overstates the matter to assert, as one district court
did, that BMS’s application “would eviscerate the class action
vehicle as we know it . . . .”61 But litigant behavior clearly indicates
something significant afoot. Class counsel have fought dozens of
BMS-prompted motions to dismiss rather than acquiesce in a
transfer to the defendant’s home jurisdiction, indicating that forum
choice indeed matters. In a minority of instances, courts have determined that BMS does apply in class actions.62 The logic follows a
54. A defendant might, if it believed that it could, conduct a “reverse auction” between
competing sets of class counsel to settle its liability at the cheapest price.
55. See Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 78 (2018).
See generally Neel U. Sukhatme, A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Forum Shopping in
Diversity Cases (Apr. 18, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1989250.
56. Martin v. Behr Dayton Thermal Prods. LLC, 896 F.3d 405, 411–13 (6th Cir. 2018)
(describing circuit split).
57. In re Petrobras Sec., 862 F.3d 250, 267–68 (2d Cir. 2017).
58. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 800–01 (5th Cir. 2014).
59. See infra Section III.B.
60. See 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:61 (5th ed. Nov.
2018 update).
61. Lyngaas v. Curaden AG, No. 17-cv-10910, 2019 WL 2231217, at *18 (E.D. Mich.
May 23, 2019).
62. E.g., In re Dicamba Herbicides Litig., 359 F. Supp. 3d 711, 722–23 (E.D. Mo. 2019);
America’s Health & Res. Ctr., Ltd. v. Promologics, Inc., No. 16 C 9281, 2018 WL 3474444, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2018); Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17 C 1948, 2018 WL 2238191,
at *10 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2018); Practice Mgmt. Support Servs., Inc. v. Cirque du Soleil, Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 3d 840, 861 (N.D. Ill. 2018); DeBernardis v. NBTY, Inc., No. 17 C 6125, 2018 WL
461228, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2018); Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 289 F. Supp. 3d 870, 874
(N.D. Ill. 2017); McDonnell v. Nature’s Way Prods., LLC, No. 16 C 5011, 2017 WL 4864910, at
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few simple steps. Absent class members’ claims get joined through
Rule 23’s application. The Rules Enabling Act, Rule 23’s source,
prohibits rules of procedure that “abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right.”63 The statute thus requires that “a defendant’s
due process interest . . . be the same in the class context” as it is in
any other case.64 A defendant has a due process right to demand
that the relationship between its forum contacts and a plaintiff’s
claim meet a particular jurisdictional threshold. If a defendant has
this right in an individual action, the Rules Enabling Act cannot
allow the right to disappear just because the claimant joins the case
as an absent class member.65
The majority of federal courts disagree and have fashioned a
class action exception to BMS.66 Two of their justifications, one
rooted in federalism and the other in due process, are unconvincing.
The third, which rests on a presumption of absent class member
juridical irrelevance, holds promise. But it needs further elaboration.
1. Federalism and the class action exception
BMS has had a negligible impact on state class action litigation,67
while federal courts have wrestled with the decision. This pattern
makes sense, at least superficially. BMS only matters when class
members come from different states. Cases fitting this description
almost always qualify for federal subject matter jurisdiction.68 If a

*4 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Wenokur v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., No. CV-17-00165-PHXDLR, 2017 WL 4357916, at *4 n.4 (D. Ariz. Oct. 2, 2017); In re Dental Supplies Antitrust Litig.,
No. 16 Civ. 696 (BMC)(GRB), 2017 WL 4217115, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2017).
63. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2018).
64. Practice Mgmt., 301 F. Supp. 3d at 861.
65. See Greene, 289 F. Supp. 3d at 874; see also In re Dicamba, 359 F. Supp. 3d. at 723; In
re Dental Supplies, 2017 WL 4217115, at *9 (“Personal jurisdiction in class actions must
comport with due process just the same as any other case.”).
66. Knotts v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 346 F. Supp. 3d 1311, 1332 (D. Minn. 2018);
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:44 (15th ed. 2018 ) (“Most courts that have addressed
the applicability of the ruling to class actions have concluded that Bristol-Myers does not
apply to class actions.”).
67. As of the time of writing, Westlaw did not contain a single opinion from a state
court addressing BMS’s applicability to class actions.
68. If the plaintiffs bring a federal claim, the case satisfies the requirements for federal
question jurisdiction. If the plaintiffs bring state law claims but allege more than $5 million
in controversy, then the case typically qualifies for diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d) (2018).
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named plaintiff does not file originally in federal court, the defendant will likely remove.
At a more fundamental level, the fact that federal courts have
had to wrestle with BMS highlights a conceptual difficulty with
modern personal jurisdiction doctrine. 69 It developed in part to
referee interstate relations.70 This “horizontal federalism” motivation has long proven difficult to parse.71 Personal jurisdiction
doctrine flows from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, and thus it involves personal, not structural, concerns.72
BMS recognizes that this is so, insisting that the doctrine’s “‘primary
concern’ is ‘the burden on the defendant.’”73 A few sentences later,
however, BMS identifies state sovereignty as the doctrine’s
animating force, noting that one state’s excessive exercise of
jurisdiction infringes on the sovereignty of others.74 “[A]t times,”
the Court maintains, “this federalism interest may be decisive.”75
The doctrine’s restatement mostly in terms of substantive due
process can straighten out this tangle.76 The courts of a state have
jurisdiction over a defendant when the defendant’s relationship
with the state gives it a legitimate regulatory interest, subject to a
check for serious inconvenience to the defendant. This formulation
recognizes that courts, as institutions of state government, engage
in a regulatory exercise when they supervise litigation and enter
judgments.77 As such, litigation in a state court necessarily has

69. Cf. Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C.
L. REV. 527, 533 (2012).
70. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)
(describing the Due Process Clause “as an instrument of interstate federalism”); cf. Bradt,
supra note 50, at 1179–80 (contrasting the “theoretical justifications for limitations on
jurisdiction” and including a “power theory” based on concerns about state sovereignty).
71. For a thorough treatment, see Allan Erbsen, Impersonal Jurisdiction, 60 EMORY L.J.
1, 61–74 (2010).
72. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982).
73. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017).
(quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Charles W. Rhodes, Liberty, Substantive Due Process, and Personal
Jurisdiction, 82 TUL. L. REV. 567, 602–19 (2007); A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Revised Analysis, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 617, 633–34 (2006).
77. As Clyde Spillenger argues, modern personal jurisdiction law originated in
concerns about the legitimate extent of a state’s regulatory authority. Clyde Spillenger, Risk
Regulation, Extraterritoriality, and Domicile: The Constitutionalization of American Choice of Law,
1850-1940, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1240, 1326–27 (2015).
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implications for the state’s relationship with others. The excessive
exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of one state projects the state’s
power beyond situations in which it has a legitimate regulatory
interest, at odds with a system of limits on the respective states’
sovereign authority.78 Individuals have a right to a government that
abides by limits on its power, and thus they can object by raising a
personal jurisdiction defense.79
If this description of personal jurisdiction doctrine is correct,80
one wonders why BMS has anything to do with federal class actions
at all.81 If a court exercises the sovereign power of the government
to which it belongs, then the jurisdictionally relevant sovereign for
the federal courts should be the United States. When a federal court
adjudicates, it does not occasion an infringement on one state’s
power by another state’s instrument of government.82 A defendant’s
contacts with one state or another are therefore irrelevant.83
Horizontal federalism concerns should be inapposite; as one district
court insisted, “[a] nationwide class action in federal court is not
about a state’s overreaching[.]”84
Some courts have justified a class action exception to BMS with
this reasoning.85 While we agree that federalism’s irrelevance should
support the exception on policy grounds,86 a legal argument
anchored solely in federalism terms proves too much. No principled
reason exists to sideline standard personal jurisdiction doctrine
only in class actions, as the argument succeeds (or fails) equally for

78. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1780.
79. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011).
80. Cf. James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction:
Implications for Modern Doctrine, 90 VA. L. REV. 169, 231–32 (2004) (conceding that “[l]anguage
in modern Supreme Court decisions . . . suggests that the Court conceives of [personal
jurisdiction] as a species of substantive due process,” but arguing that the modern test for
personal jurisdiction “is considerably out of line with the rest of substantive due process
doctrine”).
81. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1367 (N.D.
Ga. 2018); In re Chinese Mfr. Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at
*19–20 (E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017).
82. Sloan v. Gen. Motors LLC, 287 F. Supp. 3d 840, 859 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
83. See, e.g., id. at 857–58.
84. Chinese Mfr. Drywall, 2017 WL 5971622, at *20.
85. See Pascal v. Concentra, Inc., No. 19-cv-02559-JCS, 2019 WL 3934936, at *5 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 20, 2019); Cabrera v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, No. LA CV17-08525 JAK (JPRx), 2019
WL 1146828, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019); Sanchez, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1367; Chinese Mfr.
Drywall, 2017 WL 5971622, at *19–20.
86. See infra p. 1548.

1527

004.MARCUS_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/25/20 11:19 AM

2019

all federal litigation.87 Congress has enacted more expansive jurisdictional provisions for some types of federal litigation, and Rule 4
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exempts certain types of
claims from standard doctrine.88 Otherwise, since at least 1938, a
federal court’s jurisdictional reach equals that of a state court of the
state where the federal court sits.89 A court-fashioned class action
exception, justified in federalism terms, usurps control over jurisdictional policy that belongs either to Congress or to the Federal
Civil Rules Advisory Committee.90
2. Due process and the class action exception
A second justification for a class action exception to BMS
explains that the due process protections Rule 23 extends to defendants obviate any need for personal jurisdiction limits.91 As one
court argued, “[p]ersonal jurisdiction is rooted in fairness to the
defendant, and Rule 23 provides significant safeguards to that
end.”92
Stated in such conclusory terms, the justification is weak. One
set of fairness protections cannot substitute for another just because
both vindicate due process. A proceeding can violate a party’s due
process rights in various ways. A court may honor due process

87. E.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, National Personal Jurisdiction, 68 EMORY L.J. 509, 523–30

(2019).
88. Id. at 521–22.
89. A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction for Our Federal Courts, 87

DENV. U. L. REV. 325, 326–27 (2010); cf. Muir v. Nature’s Bounty (DE), Inc., No. 15 C 9835,
2018 WL 3647115, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2018) (noting that “Bristol-Myers imposes an indirect
bar on federal courts’ exercise of . . . personal jurisdiction” through the application of Rule
4).
90. But cf. Patrick Woolley, Rediscovering the Limited Role of the Federal Rules in
Regulating Personal Jurisdiction, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 565 (2019) (challenging the assumption that
the Federal Rules can regulate amenability to jurisdiction).
91. Ross v. Huron Law Grp. W. Va., PLLC, No. 3:18-0036, 2019 WL 637717, at *3–4
(S.D.W. Va. Feb. 14, 2019); Hicks v. Hous. Baptist Univ., No. 5:17-CV-629-FL, 2019 WL 96219,
at *5 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 3, 2019); Casso’s Wellness Store & Gym, LLC v. Spectrum Lab. Prods.,
Inc., No. 17-2161, 2018 WL 1377608, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 19, 2018); Molock v. Whole Foods
Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 126–27 (D.D.C. 2018).
92. Allen v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-01279-WHO, 2018 WL 6460451, at *7
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2018); see also In re Takata Airbag Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2599, 2019 WL
2570616, at *18 (S.D. Fla. June 21, 2019); Cabrera v. Bayer Healthcare, LLC, No. LA CV1708525 JAK (JPRx), 2019 WL 1146828, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019); Molock, 297 F. Supp. 3d at
126; In re Chinese Mfr. Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *14 (E.D.
La. Nov. 30, 2017).
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limitations on non-party preclusion, for example.93 But it can
nonetheless violate the defendant’s due process rights by excusing
the plaintiff from notifying the defendant before entering judgment.94
Due process provides for fundamental fairness in different, nonfungible ways at different stages in a case’s life cycle.
A more convincing effort to justify a class action exception in
due process terms stresses what “the requirements of Rule 23 class
certification ensure[,]” that “the defendant is presented with a
unitary, coherent claim to which it need respond only with a unitary,
coherent defense.”95 To expand on this logic: if the named plaintiff’s
claim arises out of the defendant’s purposeful availment of the
forum, this individual claim meets specific jurisdiction requirements, BMS or no. Rule 23 requires that the adjudication of all class
members’ claims involve basically the same evidence and legal
arguments. Thus, the burden on the defendant to defend a class suit
on the merits, so the logic goes, differs in no appreciable way from
the burden that an individual defense of the named plaintiff’s claim
entails. “[T]he unitary nature of [a] class claim” justifies “haling the
defendant into court to answer” all of the class members’ claims “in
a forum that has specific jurisdiction . . . based on the representative’s
claim” alone.96
This argument has roots in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the
only time the Court has addressed the intersection between Rule 23
and personal jurisdiction.97 Shutts determined that a court can enter
a judgment resolving absent class members’ claims even if the class
members lack jurisdictionally adequate contacts with the forum
state, so long as the court provides “safeguards” to ensure the
adequate representation of class member interests.98 Protected
thusly, absent class members can “sit back and allow the litigation
to run its course[.]” They can justifiably assume that the named
93. The Due Process Clause requires strict limits on non-party preclusion. See Taylor
v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).
94. Cf. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (holding that
due process requires notice “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the” lawsuit).
95. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1366 (N.D.
Ga. 2018).
96. Id. at 1366.
97. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
98. Id. at 810; see also Richard A. Nagareda, Administering Adequacy in Class
Representation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 287, 310 (2003).
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plaintiffs’ effort to win her own claim will also benefit their claims.99
The “fewer burdens” than what litigation imposes on a defendant
mean that absent class members can do without the protections that
personal jurisdiction limitations offer.100
Shutts rests on two intertwined supports. First, class certification
requirements and Rule 23’s protections for absent class members
ensure the adequate representation of their interests, obviating the
need for class member participation.101 Second, this representation
happens without the imposition of any meaningful burden on
absent class members. One of these supports falls away when the
party seeking protection is the defendant, not an absent class
member.102 Rule 23 and the “unitary, coherent”103 case it requires
may indeed ensure that a merits defense against the named
plaintiff’s claim suffices as a merits defense against all class
members’ claims. But the notion that a class action imposes no
meaningful burden on a defendant beyond what an individual
claim occasions is absurd. The additional burden is indisputable,104
even if one makes the formalistic assumption that a defendant’s
investment in litigating the merits does not differ from an individual
case to a class action.105 We agree that the “unitary, coherent” case
Rule 23 requires should favor a class action exception.106 Class
certification means that, in real-world terms, the difference to the
defendant between litigating a single-state class action (which BMS

99. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810, 812.
100. Id. at 811.
101. Nagareda, supra note 98, at 310 (“[T]he due process checklist in Shutts tracks the

familiar taxonomy of exit, voice, and loyalty rights[.]”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 370, 375–76 (2000) (conceiving of rights to notice, to opt out, and to a finding of adequate
representation in terms of rights of exit, voice, and loyalty, and suggesting that these rights
undergird a “theory of representational adequacy”).
102. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 810.
103. Sanchez v. Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1366 (N.D.
Ga. 2018).
104. Class actions necessarily increase costs above and beyond individual litigation.
The class certification motion, for instance, involves time-consuming, expensive litigation. A
loss on the merits authorizes the court to shift the cost of notice to the defendants. Hunt v.
Imperial Merchant Servs., Inc., 560 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2009); 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 8:33 (5th ed., 2018).
105. Cf. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408–09
(2010) (insisting that the class certification’s effect—a transformation of a dispute from one
with $500 at stake to one with $5 million at stake— “has no bearing . . . on legal rights”).
106. See infra pp. 1547–49.
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would not implicate) and a multi-state class action is not so
significant as to require a wholesale change in decades of personal
jurisdiction practice.107 But the claim that Rule 23 and personal
jurisdiction doctrine are fungible in terms of due process is
implausible.
3. Juridical irrelevance, the regulatory model, and the class action
exception
The third justification for a class action exception simply posits
that absent class members “are not parties for the purpose of
constitutional and statutory doctrines governing whether a court
has the power to adjudicate their claims.”108 This argument has
solid if superficial support. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
“[n]onnamed class members . . . may be parties for some purposes
and not for others.”109 Defendants can rarely allege counterclaims
against absent class members, for instance,110 and absent class
members have no input when the parties consent to a magistrate
judge.111 But the justification also veers toward the ipse dixit unless
it can answer the basic question: why shouldn’t an absent class
member count as a party for personal jurisdiction purposes?112
107. See infra pp. 1547–49.
108. Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820 (N.D. Ill. 2018); see also Sanchez v.

Launch Tech. Workforce Sols., LLC, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1360, 1365 (N.D. Ga. 2018); Molock v.
Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 126 (D.D.C. 2018); Knotts v. Nissan N. Am., Inc.,
346 F. Supp. 3d 1310, 1333 (D. Minn. 2018); Fitzhenry-Russell v. Dr. Pepper Snapple Grp.,
Inc., Case No. 17-cv-00564 NC, 2017 WL 4224723, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 22, 2017); In re Chinese
Mfr. Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., Civil Action MDL No. 09-2047, 2017 WL 5971622, at *12
(E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017); Morgan v. U.S. Xpress, Inc., Case No. 3:17-cv-00085, 2018 WL
3580775, at *5 (W.D. Va. July 25, 2018).
109. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9 (2002); see also Sanchez, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 1368–
69; Coleman v. Labor and Indus. Review Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017).
For a reinterpretation of this statement and criticism of the claim that class members can be
parties for some purposes and not others, see A. Benjamin Spencer, Out of the Quandary:
Personal Jurisdiction Over Absent Class Members Explained, 39 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2019)
(Draft at 4-7) (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3461113).
110. Owner-Operator Indep. Driver Ass’n v. Arctic Express, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 963,
967–68 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
111. Koby v. ARS Nat’l Servs., Inc., 846 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2017).
112. One district court explained that “absent class members are not parties for
purposes of diversity of citizenship, amount in controversy, and Article III standing . . . .”
Personal jurisdiction, like subject matter jurisdiction, “set[s] forth the conditions under which
a particular sovereign’s courts may hear a case” and thus “[i]t follows that there is no good
reason why absent class members should be treated as non-parties for purposes of
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This is where the regulatory conception can help. It lends
normative support to the notion that absent class members should
not count as discrete, individual parties and are therefore juridically
irrelevant.113 The regulatory conception treats the class action as a
device to enable law enforcement. A group of undifferentiated
regulatory beneficiaries, absent class members serve as indistinct
vessels through whom litigation can vindicate substantive liability
policy. Details of each one’s claim, such as where exactly it arose,
do not matter. The case emphasizes the defendant’s conduct and
the proper regulatory response. If the named plaintiff’s claim arises
out of the defendant’s forum contacts, the court has enough
legitimate regulatory authority to adjudicate for the class.114
We suspect that something like an appreciation for litigation’s
regulatory role lurks somewhere in the motivation for the class
action exception to BMS. Most of the cases that have presented the
issue involve small-scale consumer protection claims. Affected
consumers often have no idea that they are injured or do not care if
they are. With no meaningful breach of the social peace to repair,
the litigation of these claims makes little sense in conflict resolution
terms. The only real argument for many negative value class

establishing subject matter jurisdiction, but as parties for purposes of establishing personal
jurisdiction . . . .” Al Haj v. Pfizer Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 815, 820–21 (N.D. Ill. 2018). The district
court reasoned that “[a]bsent class members are not parties for purposes of determining
whether there is complete diversity of citizenship in cases governed by state substantive
law[,]” citing the Supreme Court’s 2002 Devlin decision. It continued: “Nor are they parties
for purposes of calculating the amount in controversy in diversity suits not brought under
the Class Action Fairness Act . . . .” Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 820. This argument relies in
significant measure on an outdated and now-erroneous understanding of absent class
members as irrelevant for the purposes of assessing diversity of citizenship and determining
the amount-in-controversy. The Class Action Fairness Act, passed in 2005, provides that the
diversity of citizenship requirement is satisfied when “any member of a class of plaintiffs is
a citizen of a State different from any defendant . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)(A). It also pegs
the amount-in-controversy requirement to the total amount the case implicates, a sum that
necessarily includes the value of the absent class member’s claims. 1332(d)(2). The category
of “diversity suits not brought under the Class Action Fairness Act” to which the district
court refers seems only to include defendant class actions, a set different from ones
addressed by Bristol-Myers. Al Haj, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 820 (citing Travelers Property Casualty
v. Good, 689 F.3d 714 (7th Cir. 2012)).
113. Cf. Wood, supra note 39, at 616 & n.50 (explaining personal jurisdiction’s exclusive
focus on the named plaintiff with reference to the “representational” model of the class
action, and claiming that Abram Chayes’ version of the regulatory model of litigation favors
the “representational” model of the class action).
114. For a summary of a related argument, see Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and
Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (2018).
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actions is regulatory.115 As of the time of writing, personal
jurisdiction doctrine post–BMS offers district courts the rare doctrinal
lever they can pull however they want, because no circuit has yet
addressed the issue.116 A skeptical district judge could freely apply
BMS and raise a jurisdictional hurdle to the prosecution of negative
value cases. The fact that a majority of courts have done otherwise
suggests some deep underlying acceptance of or even enthusiasm
for litigation in a regulatory vein.
As we argue in Part IV, this majority has rightly exempted class
actions from BMS’s reach. But for those anxious to preserve the
class action’s power, a preexisting commitment to the regulatory
conception runs into trouble as a motivation for doctrinal design. A
powerful class action benefits from the conflict resolution conception when the focus shifts from personal to subject matter
jurisdiction.
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
AND THE INJURY DIFFERENCE PROBLEM
The federal courts have long struggled to navigate the tricky
intersection between class actions and Article III standing
doctrine.117 The “injury difference problem” often arises: when do
differences between the named plaintiff and absent class members
deprive the former of standing to sue on behalf of the latter? The
problem’s persistence results in part from the Supreme Court’s
conflicting guidance on the administration of standing doctrine
in class actions. Imprecision in how the lower federal courts
categorize the problem’s variations might also bear some responsibility. But the injury difference problem largely disappears if
absent class members are juridically relevant, a status the conflict
resolution conception supports. Their juridical irrelevance, by

115. E.g., David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 913, 924 (1998) (“[T]he small claim class action strikes me as one that serves the
purpose not of compensating those harmed in any significant sense . . . but rather. . . the
purpose of allowing a private attorney general to contribute to social welfare by bringing an
action whose effect is to internalize to the wrongdoer the cost of the wrong.”).
116. E.g., Gress v. Freedom Mortg. Corp., 386 F. Supp. 3d 455, 461 (M.D. Pa. 2019)
(commenting on the dearth of circuit guidance).
117. E.g., Jean Wegman Burns, Standing and Mootness in Class Actions: A Search for
Consistency, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1239, 1262 (1989).
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contrast, triggers tricky justiciability questions that existing
doctrine poorly answers.
A. The Supreme Court’s Muddled Guidance
By the mid–1970s, the Supreme Court had developed a basic
principle of standing in class actions: a named plaintiff must have
some injury of her own and cannot invoke class members’ injuries
to support her own claim for standing.118 The Court’s subsequent
efforts to build on this foundation have zigged and zagged in
confusing ways.119 Blum v. Yaretsky, the Court’s initial engagement
with the injury difference problem, involved the adequacy of
procedures that New York State used to determine whether to
transfer Medicaid recipients living in nursing homes from one level
of care to another.120 The named plaintiffs, whom the state had
transferred from a higher level of care to a lower one, had standing
to sue on behalf of a class of similarly treated recipients.121 But they
lacked standing to challenge the adequacy of procedures for transfers
from a lower to a higher level of care. “[T]he conditions under which
such transfers occur are sufficiently different from those which
respondents do have standing to challenge[,]” the Court explained,
“that any judicial assessment of their procedural adequacy would
be wholly gratuitous and advisory.”122
Lewis v. Casey follows neatly from Blum.123 The named plaintiffs,
inmates in Arizona prisons, challenged a range of policies and
practices in use at all facilities in the state that limited court access

118. Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976) (“That a suit may
be a class action, however, adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named
plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured,
not that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they
belong and which they purport to represent.’” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502
(1975))); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974);
Note, Class Standing and the Class Representative, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (1981).
119. NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145, 160
(2d Cir. 2012) (commenting on “tension” in the Court’s guidance); Plumbers Union Local No.
12 Pension Fund v. Nomura Asset Acceptance Corp., 632 F.3d 762, 769 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting
that “the Supreme Court has not been consistent”).
120. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 994–96 (1982).
121. Id. at 1000.
122. Id. at 1001.
123. Whether Lewis v. Casey is really a decision about standing or a decision about the
scope of an injunctive remedy is up for debate. E.g., 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 3531.2, 3531.6 (4th ed. 2019).
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for prisoners.124 At trial, only one named plaintiff proved an actual
injury, and that injury involved only one specific barrier to court
access at one prison.125 The system-wide injunction the district court
issued to correct the range of problems at all facilities could not
stand. As the Court reasoned, “[t]he actual-injury requirement” for
Article III standing “would hardly serve [its] purpose . . . if once a
plaintiff demonstrated harm from one particular inadequacy in
government administration, the court were authorized to remedy
all inadequacies in that administration.”126
Lewis v. Casey and Blum seem to hinge the named plaintiff’s
standing to litigate a class action and the court’s power to issue a
class-wide remedy on some threshold of similarity between the
injury she suffers and the injuries she alleges for the class as a
whole. In Gratz v. Bollinger, the Court backed away from this
jurisdictional prerequisite. One of the named plaintiffs, who had
unsuccessfully applied for admission as a freshman to the
University of Michigan, challenged the university’s affirmative
action policies for both freshman and transfer admissions.127 Citing
Blum and Lewis, Justice Stevens insisted in dissent that differences
between the freshman and transfer admission policies denied the
named plaintiff standing to challenge the latter.128 Chief Justice
Rehnquist responded for the majority, asking “whether the
relevance of this variation . . . is a matter of Article III standing at
all or whether it goes to the propriety of class certification pursuant
to Rule 23.”129 Without answering directly, he hinted that Rule 23,
not a standalone jurisdictional prerequisite, best addresses the
necessary nexus between the named plaintiffs’ injuries and the
class’s. Quoting from the “[p]articularly instructive” General
Telephone Co. of Southwest v. Falcon,130 a case about class certification,
the Chief Justice reasoned that the named plaintiff could represent

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346–47 (1996).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 357 (emphasis omitted).
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251 (2003).
Id. at 286–87 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 263 (majority opinion). The majority noted “tension in our prior cases in this
regard.” Id. at 263 n.15.
130. Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982); see also 1 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:6 (5th ed. 2018) (discussing Falcon).
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both freshman and transfer applicants because their claims all
“implicate[]” the “same set of concerns.”131
B. The Injury Difference Conundrum
1. Three injury difference scenarios
Not surprisingly, given the tension in Supreme Court treatments
of class standing, lower courts have struggled to craft a consensus
approach to the injury difference problem. A classification of the
three ways in which the problem typically arises can help shed
some light. The first is the “different defendant, same law, same
conduct” scenario. The named plaintiff sues several defendants on
behalf of the class. She alleges that all defendants engaged in the
same general course of conduct, and that the same body of substantive law gives all class members their claims. But only one of the
defendants actually injured the named plaintiff; different defendants
injured different class members.
A few courts have held that named plaintiffs have standing to
sue on behalf of the class under these circumstances so long as a
“juridical link” joins all of the defendants’ conduct together.132 Such
a juridical link exists, the Seventh Circuit held, if the defendants
engaged in “a conspiracy or concerted scheme,” or if their conduct
is “otherwise ‘juridically related in a manner that suggests a single
resolution of the dispute would be expeditious’ . . . .”133 A court has
jurisdiction under this scenario because after class certification “the
class as a whole[,]” not individual members or the named plaintiff,
“is the focal point” for the purposes of assessing standing.134
The second version of the injury difference problem involves
the “same defendant, different laws, same conduct” scenario. It
arises in multistate class actions alleging state law claims. The
named plaintiff sues a defendant for an undifferentiated course of
conduct it directed at all class members. They happen to live in
different states, and the relevant substantive liability doctrine is

131. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 267.
132. Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 678–80 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Stewart v.

Bureau Inv. Group No. 1, LLC, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1154–56 (M.D. Ala. 2014).
133. Payton, 308 F.3d at 679 (quoting La Mar v. H&B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461,
466 (9th Cir. 1973)).
134. Id. at 681.
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state law. Choice of law rules suggest that the law of each class
member’s home state will govern each one’s claim.
Differences in the state laws that apply in multistate cases pose
hurdles to class certification,135 albeit not necessarily irreducible
ones.136 But some courts never get to class certification, reasoning
that a named plaintiff lacks standing to sue on behalf of class
members from different states.137 This limitation, it seems, involves
a corollary to the basic principle that “the plaintiff generally must
assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim
to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” 138 A
Connecticut resident injured in Connecticut has standing to bring a
Connecticut law claim against the defendant, but he has no
standing to bring claims under Massachusetts law.139 Standing
doctrine requires that the applicable law give the plaintiff a right to
recover,140 and Massachusetts law gives the Connecticut resident
no claim.141
The “same defendant, same laws, different conduct” scenario
creates the third version of the injury difference problem. The
named plaintiff and the absent class members share a defendant in
common, and they allege claims under a single body of law. But the
conduct giving rise to their alleged injuries differs from one class
member to another.142 Securities fraud litigation often involves this
type of difference. The named plaintiff owns one type of security,

135. E.g., Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 590 (9th Cir. 2012).
136. E.g., Sullivan v. DB Invs., Inc., 667 F.3d 273, 301 (3d Cir. 2011); In re McCormick &

Co., 217 F. Supp. 3d 124, 141–42 (D.D.C. 2016); 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 4:61 (5th ed. Nov. 2018 update).
137. E.g., Brenner v. Vizio, Inc., Case No. C17-5897 BHS, 2018 WL 2229274, at *2–*3
(W.D. Wash. May 16, 2018); Edwards v. North American Power & Gas, LLC, 120 F. Supp. 3d
132, 138–39 (D. Conn. 2015); In re G-Fees Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35–36 (D.D.C.
2008).
138. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
139. Richards v. Direct Energy Servs., LLC, 120 F. Supp. 3d 148, 155 (D. Conn. 2015).
140. Cf. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500 (“[T]he standing question . . . is whether the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim rests properly can be understood as granting
persons in the plaintiff’s position a right to judicial relief.”).
141. Corcoran v. CVS Health Corp., 169 F. Supp. 3d 970, 990 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
142. E.g., Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 1998).
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for instance, but tries to sue on behalf of class members who own
related but different securities.143
2. Injury difference, standing, and rule 23
The lower federal courts have responded in different ways to
the three scenarios. The Seventh Circuit’s approach to the “different
defendant, same law, same conduct” version represents a minority
view. The application of the juridical link doctrine enables a named
plaintiff to sue a defendant who did not injure her. To most courts,
this license conflicts with the basic standing principle that the
Supreme Court has unambiguously articulated for class actions.144
A plaintiff must have standing to assert a claim against a defendant,
class action or no, and “Rule 23 . . . cannot affect the plaintiff’s
Article III standing to sue the non-injurious defendants.”145
The other two scenarios have generated more entrenched
division in the federal courts as they have struggled to respond.146
Some have used a “standing approach” to address injury difference.
Attempting fidelity to cases like Lewis v. Casey and Blum, these
courts insist that “standing . . . [is a] jurisdictional requirement[]
that must be satisfied prior to class certification.”147 Thus, some
standalone jurisdictional inquiry must precede a Rule 23 analysis.
143. E.g., NECA-IBEW Health & Welfare Fund v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 693 F.3d 145,
158–65 (2d Cir. 2012); In re Bear Stearns Mortg. Pass-Through Certificates Litig., 851 F. Supp.
2d 746, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Fort Worth Emps.’ Ret. Fund v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 862 F.
Supp. 2d 322, 330–41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); F.D.I.C. v. Countrywide Financial Corp., No. 2:12-CV4354 MRP (MANx), 2012 WL 5900973, at *9–*10 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2012); In re Salomon Smith
Barney Mut. Fund Fees Litig., 441 F. Supp. 2d 579, 604–07 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Other common
scenarios involve consumer protection cases, where the class members purchased different
products. E.g., Anderson v. Jamba Juice Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2012);
Brazil v. Dell Inc., No. C-07-01700 RMW, 2008 WL 4912050, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2008).
Still others involve impact litigation. E.g., Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir.
2014); Stevens v. Harper, 213 F.R.D. 358, 367–68 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
144. E.g., Wong v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 789 F.3d 889, 896 (8th Cir. 2015); Akaosugi
v. Benihana Nat’l Corp., No. C 11-01272 WHA, 2011 WL 5444265 at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9,
2011); Buetow v. A.L.S. Enters., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1045–46 (D. Minn. 2008); In re FEMA
Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 570 F. Supp. 2d 851, 853–56 (E.D. La. 2008); Popoola
v. Md-Individual Practice Ass’n, 230 F.R.D. 424, 431–33 (D. Md. 2005); In re Franklin Mut.
Funds Fee Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 451, 462 n.7 (D.N.J. 2005); In re Eaton Vance Corp. Sec. Litig.,
220 F.R.D. 162, 170 (D. Mass. 2004).
145. Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins., 683 F.3d 59, 64 (2d Cir. 2012).
146. See Melendres, 784 F.3d at 1261–62.
147. Stevens, 213 F.R.D. at 366; see also Prado ex rel. Prado-Steinman v. Bush, 221 F.3d
1266, 1280 (11th Cir. 2000); Fort Worth, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 335; F.D.I.C., 2012 WL at *10; In re
Salomon Smith Barney, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 606.
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This inquiry has come in different guises. The Second Circuit
fashioned one in a “same defendant, same law, different conduct”
case. The named plaintiff’s standing requires that her claim
“implicate[] ‘the same set of concerns’ as the conduct alleged to
have caused injury to other members of the putative class . . . .”148
Another court crafted a functionally-oriented test. Standing depends
on whether the named plaintiff’s and class members’ claims
resulted from the “same underlying conduct,” such that the named
plaintiff has sufficient interest in redressing the defendants’ conduct
as other class members experienced it.149 Yet another inquiry asks
whether the “named plaintiff . . . suffered the same species of injury
as the members of the class, traceable to the same unlawful conduct
by a defendant.”150 One court framed the test particularly vaguely:
“some differences” between class members’ claims do not defeat
the named plaintiff’s standing, but differences that exceed this
threshold do.151
To other courts, the notion that the injury difference problem
poses a jurisdictional challenge “conflates standing and class
certification.”152 They eschew any standing analysis at all and use a
“class certification” approach to deal with differences between the
named plaintiff and absent class members. Rule 23, not Article III,
determines when the case can proceed as a class action. If the
named plaintiff individually meets standing requirements, the
standing analysis ends.

148.
149.
150.
151.

NECA-IBEW, 693 F.3d at 162.
Fort Worth, 862 F. Supp. 2d at 333, 335.
In re Bear Stearns, 851 F. Supp. at 778.
Arevalo v. Bank of America Corp., 850 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1018 (N.D. Cal. 2011); see
also Miller v. Ghiradelli Chocolate Co., 912 F. Supp. 2d 861, 869 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that
standing is sufficient if the named plaintiff and the class members’ claims are “substantially
similar”).
152. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1261 (9th Cir. 2014); E.g., Langan v. Johnson
& Johnson Consumer Cos., 897 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2018); Morrison v. YTB Int’l, Inc., 649 F.3d
533, 536 (7th Cir. 2011); Fallick v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 162 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 1998);
Molock v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 3d 114, 130 (D.D.C. 2018); Dragoslavic v. Ace
Hardware Corp., 274 F. Supp. 3d 578, 585-86 (E.D. Tex. 2017); Milbourne v. JRK Residential
America, LLC, Civil Case No. 3:12cv861, 2016 WL 1071564, at *6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 15, 2016); In
re McCormick & Co., Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 124, 144 (D.D.C. 2016); Garner v. VIST Bank, Civil
Action No. 12-5258, 2013 WL 6731903, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2013); In re Bayer Corp.
Combination Aspirin Prods. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 701 F. Supp. 2d 356, 376–77
(E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. 260, 267–69 (D. Mass. 2004).
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C. Injury Difference and Conflict Resolution
Confusion about the injury difference problem runs deep.153 On
one hand, repeated statements disclaiming one plaintiff’s standing
to litigate another plaintiff’s claim pepper Supreme Court standing
jurisprudence.154 The insistence that some independent class
standing analysis precede the class certification determination
ensures that a court does not decide a class certification motion
before confirming its jurisdiction to do so.155 On the other hand, a
vague “same set of concerns” threshold comes with none of the
specificity or doctrinal elaboration that Rule 23’s commonality,
typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements bring to
the issue of a case’s breadth.
Moreover, courts that have fashioned a version of the standing
approach do not explain why justiciability problems in class actions
disappear if the named plaintiff and the absent class members
suffer the “same species of injury.” To restate the basic principle
once again, “a party ‘generally must assert his own legal rights and
interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or
interests of third parties.’”156 Exceptions to this general rule exist,157
but none outside the class action premises third party standing
solely on some vague test that measures the factual resemblance
among claims.158 An insistence on some standalone standing inquiry
calls for more doctrinal elaboration than what currently exists to
justify the named plaintiff’s authority to vindicate the rights of others.
All of these concerns disappear if absent class members are
juridically relevant. This status makes standing in class actions no

153. In a “same defendant, same law, different conduct” case, for instance, the Second
Circuit adopted a standalone standing test. NECA-IBEW, 693 F.3d at 162. In a “same
defendant, different laws, same conduct” case, by contrast, the Second Circuit denied that
the scenario involved a standing issue. Langan, 897 F.3d at 95.
154. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 499 (1975); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163, 166 (1972).
155. Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. America, LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 358–59 (3d Cir. 2015).
156. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004).
157. E.g., 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3531.9 (3d ed. Apr. 2019 update).
158. Third party standing doctrine typically requires something more than just the
possession of similar claims, and usually a pre-existing “beneficial relationship” between the
plaintiff and the third party. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720–21 (1990);
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 117 (1976); 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3531.9.3 (3d ed. Nov. 2018 update).
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more difficult than standing in run-of-the-mill multiparty cases. For
ordinary litigation, party joinder and standing have no inherent
relationship. Consider how standing works in a case with two
plaintiffs. Employee A sues Employer, alleging that Employer
discriminated against her on the basis of disability. After filing,
Employee A moves to amend the complaint, to add Employee B as
a plaintiff alleging a race discrimination claim against Employer.
The joinder issue does not somehow turn upon Employee A’s
standing to bring Employee B’s claim. Whether the two employees
can sue together depends solely on whether their claims meet the
requirements of Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.159
If Employee B’s claim arises out of the same transaction or
occurrence as Employee A’s, and if the two claims share a common
question of law or fact, then the case can proceed with Employee B
joined.160 Employee B would have to allege the requisite injury-infact to establish standing, but this obligation has nothing to do with
Employee A’s own standing.161
Justice Scalia once described Rule 23 as merely a “species” of
“traditional joinder.”162 This understanding of class actions implies
a “bedrock rule,” that “the sole purpose of classwide adjudication
is to aggregate claims that are individually viable.”163 Justice
Sotomayor recently echoed these sentiments: “A class action is
simply ‘a procedural device’ that allows multiple plaintiffs to
aggregate their claims . . . .”164 If these characterizations are right,
then courts that use a standing approach for the injury difference

159. Of course, both parties’ claims must meet requirements specified in one of the
various statutes governing the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction.
160. E.g., Ivery v. Gen. Die Casters, Inc., Case No. 5:17-cv-37, 2017 WL 6270239, at *3–
*4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2017); Mann v. Con-Way Freight, Inc., Case No. 16-2196-CM, 2016 WL
6476548, at *2–*3 (D. Kan. Nov. 2, 2016); Rossi v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Assessors, Civil Action
File No. 1:10-CV-4254-RWS-AJB, 2011 WL 13254693, at *3–*6 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 21, 2011); Elliott
v. USF Holland, Inc., Cause No. NA 01-159-C-H/H, 2002 WL 826405, at *1–*2 (S.D. Ind. Mar.
21, 2002); Byers v. Illinois State Police, No. 99 C 8105, 2000 WL 1808558, at *2–*5 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 6, 2000).
161. Cf. Lewis v. Nevada, No. 3:13-CV-00312-MMD-WGC, 2014 WL 65799, at *3 n.9 (D.
Nev. Jan. 7, 2014); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Patriot Coal Corp., No. 3:11-0115, 2011 WL
6101921, at *10 (S.D.W. Va. Dec. 7, 2011) (warning against “conflat[ing]” the standard for
joinder under Rule 20 with Article III standing doctrine).
162. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010).
163. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 552 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
164. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1427 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(quoting WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 1.1 (5th ed. 2011)).
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problem err.165 Each class member is a separate plaintiff, such as
Employee A or B. If the Rule 23 joinder requirements are satisfied,
then the absent class members can join, just as Employees A and B
can join if their claims meet Rule 20’s requirements.166 The matter
simply does not involve the named plaintiff’s supposed attempt to
vindicate the rights of others.
Answers to the three injury difference scenarios come easily. A
plaintiff must have standing to sue “at the outset of the litigation.”167
If a named plaintiff sues a defendant who has not injured her, she
lacks standing, even if she later plans to seek joinder of those whom
the defendant did injure. The “juridical link” doctrine cannot paper
over this constitutional flaw. After all, if Employee A worked for
Employer A and Employee B for Employer B, Employee A cannot
sue Employer B even if Employers A and B engaged in similar
conduct. The putative class action can only proceed with the
problematic defendant joined if the complaint includes a named
plaintiff who alleges claims against this defendant.
By contrast, the “class certification” approach best resolves the
“same defendant, different laws, same conduct” and “same
defendant, same law, different conduct” scenarios. Before class
certification, the named plaintiff’s own injury gives her standing to
sue the defendant. After class certification, each class member’s
injury gives the class as a whole standing to sue the defendant,
under all of the laws the case implicates, and for all of the conduct
challenged. No jurisdictional gap exists that requires dismissal.
Solutions to the injury difference problem that do not assume
the juridical relevance of absent class members are possible. But
they either fit extant standing doctrine poorly, or they require a
good deal more elaboration. A named plaintiff should not have
standing to sue on behalf of juridically irrelevant absent class
members, regardless of the similarity between her and the class
members’ injuries, unless one of two claims is true. Either the
named plaintiff enjoys some sort of third party standing, or upon

165. See, e.g., Edwards v. 21st Century Ins. Co., No. 09-4364, 2010 WL 2652247, at *4
(D.N.J. June 23, 2010).
166. E.g., In re Principal U.S. Prop. Account ERISA Litig., 274 F.R.D. 649, 656–57 (S.D.
Iowa 2011) (discussing Shady Grove and following this logic).
167. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180
(2000).
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class certification the class as an entity becomes the relevant party
for standing purposes. As noted, third party standing does exist
under limited circumstances, as an exception to the general rule
that one person lacks standing to assert claims of another.168 But,
despite the odd and poorly supported claim to the contrary,169 this
doctrine shares—at best—a “confused conceptual nexus” with
“class-action theory.”170 Given the extent of doctrinal detail that
characterize other third party standing doctrines, and given the
tens of thousands of class actions that the federal courts have
adjudicated, one would expect a far more developed doctrinal
foundation for this approach to standing in class actions.
The “class as entity” theory treats the class as a whole, not any
member (named or absent), as the relevant party for standing
purposes.171 It has some doctrinal basis.172 In a series of cases dating
from the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court refused to dismiss class
actions when the named plaintiff’s claim became moot.173 This core
holding found support in the Court’s insistence that, after class
certification, the class “acquire[s] a legal status separate from the
interest” of the named plaintiff.174 While arguably consistent with a
“class as entity” theory,175 this line of decisions fits equally, if not
better, with the notion that class certification simply involves the

168. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); see also Brian Charles Lea, The Merits of Third-Party Standing,
24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 277, 277 (2015).
169. In Califano v. Yamasaki, the Supreme Court noted that “the Rule 23 class-action
device was designed to allow an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by
and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” 442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979). A few courts
have cited this statement in support of a claim that class action standing is a form of third
party standing, whereby the named plaintiff enjoys standing to assert claims of nonparties.
E.g., Adams v. Luxottica U.S. Holdings Corp., No. 07-1465, 2009 WL 7401970, at *2 (C.D. Cal.
July 24, 2009). Califano did not involve standing, and the Court’s statement was not about
standing.
170. E.g., 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.9.6 (3d ed. Aug. 2019 update).
171. Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2002); Vuyanich v. Republic
Nat’l Bank of Dallas, 82 F.R.D. 420, 427 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
172. E.g., Payton, 308 F.3d at 680–81 (explaining the doctrinal basis for the “entity”
theory).
173. U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397–401 (1980); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 756 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975); Sosna v.
Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 401–02 (1975). See generally United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct.
1532, 1538–39 (2018) (discussing mootness line of cases).
174. Sosna, 419 U.S. at 399.
175. Neale v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., LLC, 794 F.3d 353, 364–65 (3d Cir. 2015).
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joinder of individual parties.176 Moreover, other strains of standing
doctrine fit the entity theory poorly. Most importantly, the named
plaintiff does not recede into the class entity after certification; her
individual standing remains relevant.177
The various standing issues that arise in class actions are
complex. Our claim that the absent class members’ juridical relevance
resolves one of these issues may misfire or be inappropriate for
another.178 All we argue here is that the juridical relevance of absent
class members offers a straightforward solution to the injury
difference problem that fits existing doctrine better than others. But
to posit the juridical relevance of absent class members as a solution
to the injury difference problem is one thing. To justify this juridical
relevance is another. Here, the conflict resolution conception lends
normative support. Litigation offers individuals a process they can
use to resolve the concrete injuries each has suffered. These
individuals pursue relief as discrete parties. By this view, a
mechanism that aggregates claims together is not an alchemical
exercise that transforms individuals into an entity of
undifferentiated regulatory beneficiaries. The mechanism simply
joins them and their antecedently determined legal identities to a
case.

176. E.g., Franks, 424 U.S. at 756 (rejecting a mootness challenge on grounds that class
certification joins “identifiable individuals” with live claims to the case); Chayes, Burger
Court, supra note 16, at 28 (“In its encounters with class actions, the Burger Court has clung
to the . . . conception of the class action as a congeries of individual claims loosely bundled
together for purposes of judicial efficiency. For such purposes as . . . standing, the Court’s
decisions tend to treat class representatives and members as classical individual claimants.”).
177. Martens v. Thomann, 273 F.3d 159, 173 n.10 (2d Cir. 2001); Mary Kay Kane,
Standing, Mootness, and Federal Rule 23—Balancing Perspectives, 26 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 97–98
(1976).
178. The other major standing issue involves the question of whether each absent class
member must demonstrate his or her standing. The lower federal courts have taken
confusing—arguably contradictory, arguably resolvable—positions on this issue. Compare
Neale, 794 F.3d at 358–69, and In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 799–802 (5th Cir. 2014),
with Theane Evangelis & Bradley J. Hamburger, Article III Standing and Absent Class Members,
64 EMORY L.J. 383, 387–91 (2014) (“[S]ummarizing contradictory treatments of absent class
member standing in the case law”). For a compelling account that maintains that the issue
conflates standing, the requirements of the substantive law, and class certification, see
Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plaintiff is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481, 544–46 (2017).
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IV. BEYOND THE CLASS ACTIONS’ TWO CONCEPTIONS
The two jurisdictional problems illustrate the limited value that
the two conceptions of the class action have as guides to doctrinal
design.179 A proponent of a powerful class action can use the regulatory conception to justify the juridical irrelevance of absent class
members and thereby support a class action exception to BMS. But
this basic commitment denies the proponent an easy answer,
rooted in class member juridical relevance, to difficult standing
questions that class actions prompt. A class action skeptic can
invoke the conflict resolution conception to argue for class member
juridical relevance and thus BMS’s application in class actions. But
doing so effectively concedes away the injury difference problem
and along with it standing as a barrier to class action litigation.
We do not doubt the heuristic utility of the two conceptions, or
the models they channel, as expressing in general terms ideas about
what roles litigation can legitimately play. Nor do we challenge the
benefit these or other dichotomous models offer as analytical tools
for understanding and categorizing arguments about litigation.180
But principled doctrinal design offers a combatant one of two
choices. She can follow the implications of her baseline commitment to one conception or the other to its logical doctrinal
conclusions. Alternatively, she can embrace something other than
a commitment to one of the conceptions as an underlying motivation
for doctrinal design. We expect that few combatants in the longstanding class action wars would accept the former. Can the latter
yield doctrinal elaboration based on something other than mere
preference? The regulatory and conflict resolution conceptions
hardly exhaust the possible bases for engaging in a principled effort
to fashion doctrine. But their normative limitations do highlight the
challenge posed by reasoning from a set of foundational
commitments fixed a priori.
Principled lawmaking can proceed one procedural problem at
a time, without concern for consistency with a vague set of
theoretical priors. A pragmatic, consequences-oriented approach to
doctrinal administration, after all, is in the DNA of modern

179. For another discussion of the normative limits of models of litigation, see Bone,
supra note 37, at 954.
180. See also Bone, supra note 2, at 663–65 (describing the value of models of litigation).
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American civil procedure.181 Pragmatism in doctrinal design takes
seriously the basic objectives that animate particular requirements
and asks how these requirements can best be administered to meet
these objectives in particular contexts. If one context calls for absent
class member juridical relevance and the other for their irrelevance,
so be it.
A pragmatic treatment of each jurisdictional problem counsels
in favor of a class action exception to BMS and against a standalone
jurisdictional threshold for the injury difference scenarios. The
concrete adversity and separation of powers functions that standing
doctrine performs make the latter a straightforward case.182 By
limiting the federal courts to instances when parties have a genuine
stake in a case’s outcome, standing doctrine ensures that issues get
presented with sufficient precision in a rich factual context, that the
most effective advocate of each side participates, and that litigation
does not generate advisory opinions.183 Differences between the
named plaintiff’s claim and the absent class members’ do not
jeopardize any of these benefits. The class certification decision
requires a finding that the named plaintiff will adequately
represent the class, rendering the likelihood of ineffective advocacy
remote. The case does not involve some abstract legal theory but a
concrete argument that the defendant injured the class members in
particular ways, allegations that place legal issues in a rich factual
context. Differences between the named plaintiff’s injury and those
of absent class members in no way create a risk of an advisory
opinion, since all are indeed injured.
Nor does standing’s separation of powers motivation require
some standalone jurisdictional threshold. Ordinary conflicts over
preferences for law and policy belong in political processes.
Standing doctrine reserves the federal courts for those instances
when an injury-in-fact gives the alleged victim a special right to
pursue redress outside of ordinary democratic channels.184 If one or
the other of the injury difference scenarios threatened to allow
181. See generally David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as
a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433 (2010) (describing the connection between
pragmatism and the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of 1938).
182. See Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 465–92 (2008).
183. Id. at 468–72.
184. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881, 895 (1983).
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fights over mere preferences, not injuries, into the courts, a
standalone threshold would be wise. But it does not. Differences
among injuries is not the absence of injury, standing’s central
concern, but rather implicates concerns about the adequacy of
representation afforded those seeking redress. Rule 23, of course,
addresses this issue head-on.
The injury difference problem threatens to create none of the
mischief that standing doctrine protects against. Because the
juridical relevance of absent class members makes the standing
concern disappear, no reason exists to deny them this status. The
juridical irrelevance of absent class members for personal
jurisdiction purposes shares this justification. None of personal
jurisdiction’s basic objectives requires a deviation from the
decades’ old consensus rule, that the named plaintiff’s claim
determines the court’s territorial reach. The juridical irrelevance of
absent class members supports a class action exception to BMS and
thereby protects against an unnecessarily crabbed administration
of personal jurisdiction doctrine in class actions.
Personal jurisdiction doctrine has several objectives, but it all
flows from the basic principle that the exercise of jurisdiction must
comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”185 Personal jurisdiction in the class action’s modern era has
always depended on the relationship between the named plaintiff’s
claim and the defendant’s forum contacts. In light of this history,
unbroken until 2017, defendants can scarcely claim that “traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice,” long dormant, suddenly
awoke to require that each class member’s claim measure up by the
jurisdictional metric.
The confused state of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
complicates an effort to enumerate all of the goals assigned to the
doctrine, but in general terms two main objectives predominate.186
First, limits on a court’s territorial reach ensure that the court only
exercises adjudicatory power when the sovereign on whose behalf
it acts has legitimate regulatory authority. International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, the font of modern doctrine, expanded litigation’s
185. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
186. Peter L. Markowitz & Lindsay C. Nash, Constitutional Venue, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1153,

1173 (2014); see also Bradt, supra note 50, at 1179–80 (referring to the “power” and
“reasonableness” theories of personal jurisdiction’s “main theoretical justifications”).
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regulatory power.187 As the Supreme Court has narrowed jurisdictional boundaries over the past several decades, it has tended to do
so to privilege defendants’ volition. It emphasizes a defendant’s
decision to affiliate voluntarily with a sovereign before litigation for
purposes of the transaction at issue in the case, enabling defendants
to choose where they risk litigation.188
A class action exception to BMS does not license sovereign
overreach. If the named plaintiff’s claim arises out of the defendant’s purposefully created forum contacts, the forum state has a
legitimate regulatory interest in the conduct giving rise to the claim.
The class certification requirements ensure that the litigation does
not force the defendant to defend fundamentally different conduct
than what injured the named plaintiff. The case implicates only
what the defendant voluntarily directed at the forum state. At any
rate, concerns about sovereign overreach should weigh little in the
balance unless the class includes people injured or residing abroad.
As discussed, a federal court adjudicating a multistate class action
exercises the federal government’s power and does not project one
state’s sovereign prerogative beyond acceptable territorial limits.
As a matter of law, the federalism argument against BMS’s application in class action proves too much. But the idea behind it, that a
federal class action simply does not have federalism implications of
the sort prompted by state court litigation, is sensible and counsels
against BMS’s migration into the class action’s domain.
Personal jurisdiction’s second main function is to ensure that
the exercise of adjudicatory power is reasonable. This determination includes attention to the burden the forum choice visits on the
defendant, but it also assesses “‘the forum [s]tate’s interest in . . .
the dispute,’ ‘the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and
effective relief,’ [and] ‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in . . .
the most efficient resolution of controversies.’”189 The undifferentiated nature of the defendant decreases the likelihood that the
forum state has any less of a regulatory interest in the defendant’s

187. Stephen Gardbaum, New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 558–61 (1997).
188. E.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
189. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
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conduct than any other state.190 As for the burden on the defendant,
the “unitary, coherent” case required by Rule 23 lessens (if not
eliminates) the gap between what the named plaintiff’s case alone
foists on the defendant and what the class action causes. Finally, a
single multistate class action surely compares favorably by an
efficiency metric to several single state ones.191
CONCLUSION
The solutions to the personal and subject matter jurisdiction
problems that this essay proposes may seem unprincipled. If absent
class members are juridically irrelevant, their status renders BMS
irrelevant. But juridical irrelevance creates standing problems
when class member injuries differ. These problems disappear if
absent class members are juridically relevant. But juridical relevance
opens the door to personal jurisdiction concerns.
Doctrinal design in class actions has never followed a rigidly
principled course. The evolution of this doctrine has always had a
pragmatic bent to it, as courts have tried to balance the claimmobilizing, rights-vindicating power the device promises with the
demand that class actions remain true to basic assumptions about
how civil litigation legitimately proceeds.192 The regulatory and
conflict resolution conceptions of the class action have significant
heuristic value, as they illuminate the many issues of public policy
and institutional legitimacy that the class action implicates. But
pragmatism, not these conceptions, should take center stage when
new problems of class action administration arise.
190. A premise of general jurisdiction is that, because the defendant is “at home” in the
state, the state has an ongoing regulatory interest in everything the defendant does. Allan R.
Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV. 527, 538–39
(2012). Arguably, then, this “home” state has a superior regulatory interest. But, consistent
with BMS, class counsel could file multiple single-state class actions and have them
consolidated and transferred through the MDL system to any district court in the country.
The MDL transferee court surely has no more superior regulatory interest than a court in
which a multistate class action is filed. The only difference is that, in the latter scenario, class
counsel picks the forum, while in the former the choice is up to the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation.
191. These cases would likely get consolidated and transferred through the MDL
system. But the MDL transferee court is no more efficient than a single multistate class suit.
The only difference has to do with who chooses the forum. See supra note 190.
192. Marcus, History Part I, supra note 3, at 591 (commenting on the “pragmatic
balancing strategy” courts used to develop class action doctrine during its formative years
in the late 1960s and 1970s).
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